An API Honeypot for DDoS and XSS Analysis G Leaden, Marcus Zimmermann, Casimer DeCusatis, and Alan G. Labouseur

What

Honeypots are servers or systems built to mimic critical parts of a network, distracting attackers while logging their data to develop profiles. This poster presents how we built a honeypot disguised as a **RE**presentational State Transfer (REST) Application Programming Interface (API) and the analysis of some of the data we collected.

Analysis

Many unauthorized attempts culminated in a DDoS attack and an XSS insertion performed against the G-star REST API. The XSS attacks are curl-like requests sent to load and run a file on our server. Interestingly, a very similar attack sequence was recently documented by F-Secure, a Finnish cyber-security company.

DDoS

- The attack lasted from May 25, 2017 to June 1, 2017.
- *Responses/second* steadily rose from 500 *R*/*s* to 6000 *R*/*s*.
- Created 275,000,000 log entries • Log file expanded to 18+ GB (server ran out of storage)
- command type: HEAD
- command text: home



Hive plot displaying a random sample of 150 points from G-star logs. Data sampled is from February 6, 2017 - May 25, 2017



Prominent nodes denote "injections into G-star that differ from normal traffic. Data sampled is from February 6, 2017 – May 25, 2017

- XSS

 - GET cgi
 - POST command.php

 - GET ; wget\$IFS-O\$IFS'

Our NSF-funded SecureCloud environment aims to combat the growing number of cyber attacks against cloud networks. G-star, the Dynamic Graph Database, is used within SecureCloud to help us organize, visualize, and analyze cyber attack data. After making a web interface to G-star available online we observed a number of unauthorized connection attempts to its REST API. In response to these attacks, we created a new REST API honeypot, "Pasithea" (the Greek goddess of rest).

• Command types and text:

- GET ;rm\$IFS-f\$IFS'
- GET ;chmod\$IFS'777'\$IFS'
- GET ;sh\$IFS-c\$IFS'
- took 25 seconds

Prominent nodes display the XSS attempt on G-star. Data sampled is from March 11, 2017 – March 16, 2017

Construction and Performance

- Java
 - NanoHTTPD
 - <h1>404 Not Found</h1>
- Free micro tier

Our log files indicate cursory web crawls from Baidu, a Chinese search engine, and some attempts at exploiting a known vulnerability in Apache Tomcat web servers using "GET /manager/html".



Performance data suggests that Pasithea should be able to keep a malicious user interested with fast response times — sub 300*ms* under normal traffic — while also maintaining composure and stability under high traffic loads, even at more than 9,000 concurrent requests.



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Takes any HTTP request and responds with

• Amazon Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud (AWS EC2)

Data Captured

- command type
- command text
- client IP address
- User Agent

Tin	ne per R	eque	st at 1	0000	Compl
Time per Request (ms)	35000 -			-	-Time p
	30000 -				
	25000 -				
	20000 -				
	15000 -				
	10000 -				
	5000 -				
	0 -			_	
	0	10	100	500	1000



current time (yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)

